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Symposium

I

Building the Civilization of Arbitration
Introduction
Thomas E. Carbonneau
This is a time of affirmation and trepidation for the law of
arbitration. Last term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hall Street
Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.,' holding that contract freedom in
arbitration was not absolute and that the grounds in FAA § 10 were
"exclusive." 2 This term, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorarito
three arbitration cases. It has rendered two opinions already that signify
the Court's continuing support for and approval of arbitration. In Vaden
v. Discover Bank,4 the Court resolved a circuit split by endorsing the
"look through" 5 approach "to determine whether federal-question
jurisdiction exists over the underlying petition.",6 This approach favors
1. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Hall Street Associates,
LLC v. Mattel, Inc.: A New Englander's Tale of Statutory Supremacy in ArbitrationLaw,
[2008] STOCKHOLM REV. INT'L ARB. 19.
2. 128 S. Ct. 1396.
3. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 77 U.S.L.W. 1531 (Mar. 9, 2009); 14 Penn Plaza LLC
v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009); Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 529 (2008).
4. 77 U.S.L.W. 1531 (Mar. 9,2009).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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the recourse to arbitration and its regulation by federal law. In 14 Penn
Plaza v. Pyett,7 the Court confirmed the subject-matter arbitrability of
discrimination claims that are submitted to arbitration by the parties in a
provision of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). It thereby8
reduced the precedential significance of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
to its "narrow holding." 9 When the arbitration agreement clearly
provides for the arbitrability of statutory rights, all such rights are
arbitrable under federal law. 10 Accordingly, the Court aligned both
forms of workplace arbitration, unionized and nonunionized, to the
2
arbitrability holdings in Mitsubishi," Rodriguez,1 and Gilmer.13
The apprehension surrounding arbitration comes in the form of ever
more strident congressional opposition. 14 The latter is long-standing,' 5
but it has been endowed with new life from the political reconfiguration
of the U.S. Congress and the White House. The last twenty years have
seen largely perfunctory legislative attempts to curtail the ascendency of
arbitration.16 Although ineffective, the opposition was meant, ostensibly,
to enhance the preemptory standing of civil rights and the guarantee of a
civil jury trial. 17 In reality, the anti-arbitration sentiment in the U.S.
Congress has been fueled and financed by the American Trial Lawyers'
Association (ATLA) and encouraged by other lobbyist groups, like
Public Citizen. 18 While all the opponents of arbitration pay reverence to
the Constitution and to the sanctity of legal rights, the true concern
centers upon the "culture wars"'1 9 and tried-and-true economic advantage.
The critics of arbitration, in and out of the U.S. Congress, 20 have
focused their contempt for the process upon so-called mandatory
arbitration, 21 by which they mean adhesionary arbitration. The latter is
7. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
8. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 417 U.S. 36 (1974).

9. 129 S. Ct. at 1469.
10. Id. at 1474.
11. Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
12. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
13. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
14. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782 and H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. 1st
Sess. (2007); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, "Arbitracide": The Story of AntiArbitration Sentiment in the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 235 (2007)
[hereinafter "Arbitracide"].
15. See Carbonneau, "Arbitracide",supra note 14, at 243-46.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration,
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RES. (2009) (forthcoming).
19. See, e.g., JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA (1992).

20. See Carbonneau, "Arbitracide",supra note 14, at 239-42.
21.

See Carbonneau, supra note 18.
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commonplace in employment relationships and consumer transactions.
ATLA's quest to maintain its monopoly on the provision of adjudication
services is presented in a proclaimed concern for disadvantaged parties
and their plight in society.22 Plausible deniability notwithstanding,
nothing is innocent in politics. The virulence of the critics is motivated
by the need to control the measure and implementation of the rule of law;
it is not a concern about the rule of law itself. In the final analysis, the
interests of the average citizen are irrelevant; what is truly important is
who decides how society is governed and who controls the
administration of justice.23
There can be little doubt, despite
disingenuous rhetoric of opponents and its own imperfections, that
arbitration is ultimately in the best interest of American citizens. 24 It
remedies the serious25 deficiencies of judicial litigation and adversarial
legal representation.
The Court's promotion and protection of arbitration began in
earnest with the Burger Court. 26 The only persistent hold-out on the
Court was Justice William 0. Douglas, 7 who nonetheless thought that
CBA or labor arbitration was a legitimate, necessary, and useful dispute

22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
See id.
See Carbonneau, "Arbitracide",supra note 14, at 233-38, nn.1-10.
See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING
THE LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 2, 12-13, 200-14, 265-67 (1989).
26. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Ins., 450 U.S. 728, 746-53 (1981)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Warren F. Burger, Agenda for 2000 AD-A Need for
Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83 (1976); Warren F. Burger, Isn't There a Better
Way, 68 A.B.A. J.274 (1982); Warren F. Burger, The State of Justice, Report to the
American Bar Association, Feb. 12, 1984, 70 A.B.A. J. 62 (1984).
27. During his tenure on the Court, Justice Douglas systematically opposed the
recourse to arbitration. He voted with the majority in Wilko v. Swan. 346 U.S. 427
(1953). There, the Court chose to protect the integrity of the securities laws from
intrusion by the public policy supporting arbitration. It did so, in part, upon a narrow and
demeaning view of arbitration and its adjudicatory capabilities. Justice Douglas authored
the majority opinion in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., in which the Court
privileged the application of state law under Erie over the public policy on arbitration,
reiterating several of the Wilko invectives against arbitration. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). He
joined the dissent in PrimaPaint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., the case that began
the march to the federalization of U.S. arbitration law. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Justice
Douglas dissented with passion and eloquence in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 417 U.S.
506 (1974). There, he defended the application of the securities laws and congressional
power to legislate. Nonetheless, he was persuaded of the benefits and critical function of
CBA arbitration. See, e.g., Goodall-Sanford v. Textile Workers of Am., 353 U.S. 550
(1957); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
Moreover, he authored the Court's majority opinions in the Steelworkers Trilogy. See
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg., Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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resolution process. The "emphatic" or "strong" federal policy2 8 survived
and grew despite variations in the composition of the Court over a fortyyear period. In its decisional law, the Court systematically rewrote the
U.S. or Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 29 The FAA was enacted in 1925
as special interest legislation. 30 By the first decade of the 21 st Century, it
had become a proclamation for a new Bill of Rights in American
society. 31 The federal law on arbitration currently declares itself supreme
through the application of the federal preemption doctrine; 32 not only
validates arbitration contracts but also exempts them from the usual
requirements of contract formation; 33 pronounces a rule of nearly
28. See Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
29. The U.S. Supreme Court began its endorsement and promotion of arbitration by
proclaiming the existence of "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). See also
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1986); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984). It then introduced a qualified sense of contract freedom in arbitration,
providing that the contracting parties were free to structure their transactions however
they wished as long as they opted for arbitration. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995). Thereafter, the Court expanded the jurisdiction of
arbitration to include statutory disputes. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1986). It also increased substantially the decisional
sovereignty of the arbitrator. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003);
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). The effect of these
decisions was to permit arbitration to function with even greater autonomy and,
concomitantly, to minimize the role of judicial supervision in the process. They also
sought to reduce the volume of litigation pertaining to arbitration. See Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938
(1995). In its decisional law, the Court is bent upon delegating to arbitration as much of
the burden of civil litigation as possible. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Olver the past decade, the Court has
abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the [FAA],
building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation ... ").
30. U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1996). On the FAA and U.S. arbitration
law, see Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution In Law Through Arbitration, 56
CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 233, 245 (2008).
31. See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION ixxi (3d ed. 2009) (forthcoming).
32. It is equally significant that the Court expanded the reach of the FAA from what
was provided in § 1 of the statute. In Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, the Court adopted a very
wide view of interstate commerce and thereby extended the FAA's scope of application
to encompass almost all commercial transactions in the United States. 539 U.S. 52
(2003). In a series of rulings, it also federalized the law of arbitration and protected it
from state law conflicts by elaborating the federal preemption doctrine. See Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H.
Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., Corp. 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg., Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
33. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) (writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy gave shortshrift to the allegation that
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universal arbitrability for statutory rights by stating that arbitration has
no impact upon substantive rights because it is a mere form of trial; 34 and
provides for extreme judicial deference to arbitrator rulings. 35 High
Court decisions have upheld and expanded the jurisdictional authority of
arbitrators by allowing them, through party provision, to rule on their
the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because of its adhesionary character, stating
laconically: "Although petitioners suggest that the agreement to arbitrate here was
adhesive in nature, the record contains no factual showing sufficient to support that
suggestion."). The Court upheld the use of arbitral clauses for mandatory arbitration.
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). Accord EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
Although not a U.S. Supreme Court opinion, Harrisv. Green Tree Fin. Corp., a case
born from and molded by the Court's strong and emphatic federal policy favoring
arbitration, attests to the judicial resistance to declare arbitration agreements
unenforceable for reasons of defective contract formation. 183 F.3d 173 (3d. Cir. 1999).
In Harris, the Third Circuit upheld unqualifiedly an adhesionary arbitral clause that
contained a "carve-out" for the economically stronger party. Id. at 183. The court
emphasized that "inequality in bargaining power, alone, is not a valid basis upon which to
invalidate an arbitration agreement." Id. Additionally, "carve-outs" could be justified for
business or economic reasons, e.g., non-compete clauses. See Aames Funding Corp. v.
Sharpe, No. Civ.A.04-4337, 2004 WL 2418284 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2004); Porpora v.
Gatliff Bldg. Co., 828 N.E.2d 1081 (2005). Further, the Court, for all practical purposes,
eliminated the contract defense language at the end of FAA § 2 by creating a nearly
irrebuttable presumption that arbitration agreements were enforceable contracts. See
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). In Rodriguez
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., the Court minimized the defense of adhesion and
unconscionability. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). See also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (limiting the impact of cost distribution upon the validity
of arbitration agreements). The Court's decisional law is devoid of any case in which it
fails to uphold an arbitration agreement. But see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S.
198 (1956) (indirectly discredited); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (now discredited
and reversed).
34. In order to respond to the argument that the reference to arbitration compromised
rights that were available under a statutory regime, the Court proclaimed in Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, that arbitration represented a mere choice of trial format that
had no impact whatsoever upon substantive statutory rights. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). In a
legal system dedicated to the proposition that there are no rights without remedies, such
an assertion not only lacks credibility, but it seems to be the height of fantasy. Rights
protection is not and cannot be the same in arbitration as in court proceedings, unless the
arbitration is judicialized to the point of being a court proceeding. Moreover, with the
reversal of Wilko v. Swan, in Rodriguez v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., the Court
instituted a political correctness doctrine in regard to arbitration. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
The only way to perceive arbitration was in positive terms; therefore, arbitration was
every bit the adjudicatory process that court litigation was. Statements that arbitrators
were mere fact-finders and merchants unschooled in the law, who were unable to
interpret or apply legal rules or render a reasoned explanation of their determination,
reflected unacceptable and statutorily-outlawed judicial hostility to arbitration. The new
orthodoxy demanded allegiance to the integrity and professionalism of arbitration, no
matter what the actual reality might be in the particular circumstances.
35. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND
PRACTICE 394-459 (4th ed. 2007).
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own jurisdiction 36 and to interpret not only the contract, but the arbitral
clause as well.37 The Court's only limited success has been its inability
to restrain significantly the litigation about arbitration. 38 Despite the
likelihood of failure, attorneys continue to challenge pro-arbitration
rulings at the trial and appellate levels. 39 The Court's activist agenda on
arbitration has been resisted most effectively in California and the
Federal preemption doctrine, however,
Western United States. 40
corrected the most deviant results reached on arbitration in those
jurisdictions.41
Arbitration is a force in American society. Moreover, it is a force
for good. It brings civil justice within the grasp of all American citizens.
Arbitration is not only instrumental to all forms of commercial activity,
but it is indispensable to the legitimacy of American constitutional
government. It has progressed far beyond its status in Wilko v. Swan 42 as
36. Further, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, the Court significantly
altered the rule in FAA § 3 that courts decide threshold jurisdictional issues. 514 U.S.
938 (1995). It held that contracting parties could delegate authority to rule on jurisdiction
to the arbitrators and thereby remove jurisdictional challenges from the exclusive
purview of the courts. The ruling added greater autonomy to the arbitral process by
strengthening the arbitrators' authority and reducing the presence of the courts at the
threshold of the arbitral process.
37. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Howsam v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
38. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 444; First Options of Chi., Inc., 514 U.S. at 938.
39. Accord B.L. Harbert Int'l, LLC v. Hercules Steel, Co., 441 F.3d 905 (11 th Cir.
2006).
40. See Carbonneau, "Arbitracide", supra note 14, at 239; see also Adler v. Fred
Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773 (Wash. 2004); Higgins v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles County., 45
Cal. Rptr. 3d 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Zuver v. Airtouch Commc'ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753
(Wash. 2004) (confidentiality agreement in employment arbitration agreement is
substantively unconscionable); Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 77 U.S.L.W. 1612 (9th Cir.
Mar. 27, 2009) (No. 06-35909) (class action waiver substantively unconscionable under
Oregon law because it was "inherently one-sided" and "prevent[ed) individuals from
vindicating their rights"; severance of the waiver was prohibited by the agreement and,
therefore, did not apply).
41. See the progression in the case law from Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (U.S. Supreme Court begins federalization of arbitration
law and laids the foundation for the federal preemption doctrine), to Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S.Ct. 1204 (2006) (U.S.S.C. rejects relevance of Florida
law on topic of enforcing arbitration agreements and affirms the vitality of the
separability doctrine and, concomitantly, the autonomy of arbitration and arbitrators), and
Preston v. Ferrer,128 S.Ct. 978 (2008) (U.S. Supreme Court upholds the primacy of the
federal law of arbitration, insulating it from state law regulatory "side bars"). See also
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (state laws of contract cannot
single out arbitration contracts "for suspect status"; special requirements for their validity
cannot be mandated even for purposes of consumer protection); Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (The FAA "does displace state law to the
contrary.").
42. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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an ersatz trial mechanism destined to function in the remote and invisible
recesses of society. Arbitrators can entertain a wide range of public and
private law claims; they can decide matters of discrimination in addition
to issues of contract interpretation, performance, delivery, and
conformity to specifications.4 3
They can interpret government
regulations and enacted legislation, just like they construe the content of
private agreements. 4 Although their authority to rule originates from a
"one-off' contract, arbitrators, by their number and the frequency of their
awards, have an enormous impact upon the character and operation of
society.45 Arbitration rebalances the relationship between fairness and
functionality in adjudication. Due process ceases to be a pathology that
tears at the flesh of the parties and the integrity of law.46 It reasserts its
standing as a central and workable factor in legal civilization. Legal
rights are neither protected nor privileged by an inaccessible and endless

43. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court held, in
landmark language, that "we find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every
contract within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims .... [Tihe
Act ...provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by
skewing the otherwise hospitable inquiry into arbitrability." 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985).
This holding represents the Court's first step in the direction of eliminating all, or nearly
all, subject matter constraints on the arbitrability of disputes. In Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, the Court described the vestiges of subject-matter inarbitrability in U.S.
arbitration law when it stated: "The [FAA], standing alone, . . . mandates enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. Like any statutory directive, the [FAA]'s
mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional command." 482 U.S. 220, 226
(1987). First, the FAA never addresses, explicitly or implicitly, the arbitrability of
statutory rights-the Court just says it does. Second, no "contrary congressional
command" has ever been clear or emphatic enough to convince the Court that a federal
statute overrides the "prime directive" in FAA § 1. See, for example, the non-waiver
provisions in the securities laws in Rodriguez de Quijas and McMahon. 490 U.S. 477
(1989); 482 U.S. at 220. The "burden" that is placed upon "the party opposing
arbitration ... to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue" has never been satisfied. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
It could readily be argued that the antitrust, securities, and civil rights laws contain
nonwaiver provisions that mandate judicial recourse. In the Court's view, the nonwaiver
"command" applies only to the substantive guarantees of the act not its procedural
provisions. See id. Syllogistically speaking, because these substantive rights are not
diminished in arbitration, the latter can act as a lawful substitute for judicial recourse.
Also, as a corollary, arbitrations are "one-off' events that have little or no systemic
import. Therefore, the contract can control and parties are free to customize the
proceedings. See id.
44. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Mitsubishi
Motor Corp., 473 U.S. at 614.
45. See, e.g., AAA - Arbitration, Mediation and other forms of Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) Home Page, http://www.adr.org; National Arbitration Forum Home
Page, http://www.adrforum.com; Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services Home
Page, http://www.jamsadr.com.
46. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 24.
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process of litigation before courts. They are safeguarded only by an
adjudicatory process that achieves sound outcomes through operational
efficiency.
The U.S. Supreme Court's "work product ' 47 has generated a large
and growing arbitration bar. It also has finally begun to stimulate a
greater volume of academic activity on the topic of arbitration. The
work of legal practitioners and academics, along with the courts'
decisional law, are "Building a Civilization of Arbitration" that codifies
advances and grapples with the controversial aspects of law-in-themaking. The Penn State Dickinson School of Law takes great pride in
welcoming a distinguished group of lawyers and law teachers to the
pages of its Law Review. They are the leaders in the field of arbitration.
Their contributions identify the settled law and evaluate it from a variety
of analytical, intellectual, and institutional perspectives.
The lead article addresses the concept of designing arbitrations from
the perspective of two mainstays of the U.S. Supreme Court decisional
law on arbitration: Volt Info. Sciences, Inc.48 and Mastrobuono.49 The
article evaluates the use of contract freedom in the context of the judicial
construction of party intent. Beyond this, the symposium investigates a
wide variety of cutting-edge topics, ranging from recent landmark cases
to investment arbitration and including the reform of the FAA, the
concept of private ordering in international commercial arbitration
(ICA), empirical developments in consumer arbitration, third-party
interests in arbitration, various provocative comparative law
developments-the role of courts in national arbitration laws, a lucid
evaluation of the Russian Federation's statist concept of arbitration, an
equally insightful comparison of Canadian and United States consumer
arbitration, and an evaluation of an important recent book on ICA.
The symposium contains more enriching considerations on ICA,
including an assessment of the difficulty of balancing the tension
between arbitral autonomy and foreign mandatory public law, the impact
of arbitration on the Energy Charter Treaty, and different cultural
concepts of the utility of arbitration in commercial dispute resolution.
Since the end of WWII and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989,
arbitration has supplied global merchants with a transborder adjudicatory
process in the face of uncertainty and the unyielding and capricious
principle of sovereignty. In both domestic and international litigation,
arbitration is the purveyor of the stability and effectiveness that act as the

47. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468 (1989).
49. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
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foundation of the rule of law. Finally, the Law Review Symposium
contains a well-crafted and conceptually invigorating Reporters'
assessment of the projected Restatement, Third, of the U.S. Law of ICA.
It is Penn State Dickinson School of Law's honor to welcome the
authors and their contributions to the school's effort to promote
excellence in legal scholarship.
April 14, 2009

